Characterizing Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning by Xiao, Chaowei et al.
Characterizing Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning
Chaowei Xiao∗
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States
xiaocw@umich.edu
Xinlei Pan∗
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California, United States
xinleipan@berkeley.edu
Warren He
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California, United States
_w@eecs.berkeley.edu
Jian Peng
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, Illinois, United States
jianpeng@illinois.edu
Mingjie Sun
Tsinghua University
Beijing, P.R.China
sunmj15@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Jinfeng Yi
JD AI Research
Beijing, P.R.China
yijinfeng@jd.com
Mingyan Liu
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States
mingyan@umich.edu
Bo Li
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, Illinois, United States
lbo@illinois.edu
Dawn Song
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California, United States
dawnsong@cs.berkeley.edu
ABSTRACT
Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has achieved great success in
various applications. However, recent studies show that machine
learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. DRL mod-
els have been attacked by adding perturbations to observations.
While such observation based attack is only one aspect of potential
attacks on DRL, other forms of attacks which are more practical
require further analysis, such as manipulating environment dynam-
ics. Therefore, we propose to understand the vulnerabilities of DRL
from various perspectives and provide a thorough taxonomy of
potential attacks. We conduct the first set of experiments on the
unexplored parts within the taxonomy. In addition to current ob-
servation based attacks against DRL, we propose the first targeted
attacks based on action space and environment dynamics. We also
introduce the online sequential attacks based on temporal consis-
tency information among frames. To better estimate gradient in
black-box setting, we propose a sampling strategy and theoretically
prove its efficiency and estimation error bound. We conduct exten-
sive experiments to compare the effectiveness of different attacks
with several baselines in various environments, including game
playing, robotics control, and autonomous driving.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have become perva-
sive and led a trend of fast adoption in various commercial systems.
DNNs have also encouraged increased success in the field of deep
reinforcement learning (DRL), where the goal is to train an agent
to interact with the environments for maximizing an expected
return. DRL systems have been evaluated on games [10, 20, 21], au-
tonomous navigation [7, 25], and robotics control [14], etc. To take
advantage of this, industries are integrating DRL into production
∗Both authors contributed equally to this research.
systems [32]. However, it is well-known that DNNs are vulnerable
to adversarial perturbations [11, 15, 16, 31, 35–38]. DRL systems
that use DNNs to perform perception and policy making also have
similar vulnerabilities. For example, one of the main weaknesses
of DRL models in adversarial environments is their heavy depen-
dence on the input observations since they use DNNs to process
the observations. Moreover, since DRL models are trained to solve
sequential decision-making problems, an attacker can perturb mul-
tiple observations. In fact, the distribution of training and testing
data could be different due to random noise and adversarial ma-
nipulation [13]. Therefore, the learned policy can be vulnerable in
adversarial environments.
In this paper, we first present an extensive study of the taxon-
omy of adversarial attacks on DRL systems. Second, we propose
and evaluate 10 adversarial attacks in order to explore points in
the taxonomy that have not previously been examined in the lit-
erature. We organize adversarial attacks on DRL into a taxonomy
based on details of the victim model and other properties of the
attacker. First, we categorize these attacks based on what com-
ponent of the system the attacker is capable of perturbing. The
organization of this categorization resembles the components of
a Markov decision process (MDP): we recognize attacks that per-
turb an agent’s observations, actions, or the system’s environment
dynamics. We summarize these categories in Figure 1. Second, the
attacker’s knowledge. We categorize these attacks based on what
knowledge the attacker needs to perform the attack. Broadly, this
breaks attacks down into the already recognized white-box attacks,
where the attacker has full knowledge of the target DRL system,
and black-box attacks, where the attacker has less or no knowledge.
We will discuss this taxonomy further in Section 3.
On the other hand, existing attacks that perturb the observation
operate independently on each frame, which are too computational
intensive to run in real-time. We propose two novel strategies for
quickly creating adversarial perturbations to use in real-time attacks.
The first strategy, N-attack, trains a neural network to generate a
perturbation, reducing the computation to a single forward pass
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of adversarial attacks on deep reinforcement learning (DRL). RL environments are usually modeled as
a Markov Decision Process (MDP) that consists of observation space, action space, and environment (transition) dynamics.
Potential adversarial attacks could be applied to any of these components.
over this network. The second strategy exploits the property that,
in RL environments, the states are not independent, and later states
depend on previous state and action. Therefore, we propose online
sequential attacks, which, in contrast to attacks that operate inde-
pendently on each frame, generate a perturbation using information
from a few frames and then apply the generated perturbation to
later frames. We include our experiments with these strategies
as part of our exploration of attacks that perturb the observation.
We describe our attacks in detail in Section 4, and we present our
evaluation in Section 5.
To summarize, our contributions are: (1) We systematically or-
ganize adversarial attacks on DRL systems into a taxonomy and
devise and evaluate 10 new attacks on several DRL environments;
(2) We propose two practical strategies for carrying out an adver-
sarial attack under limited computation power, N-attack and online
sequential attack; (3) We propose two methods for efficiently query-
ing a model in black-box attacks: adaptive dimension sampling
based finite difference (SFD) method and optimal frame selection
method; (4) We provide a theoretic analysis of our proposed gra-
dient estimation method and prove its efficiency and estimation
error bound; and (5) We propose the first targeted attack that adver-
sarially perturbs a DRL system’s environment dynamics in order
to cause an agent fail in a specific way, and this method is more
practical in real world applications.
2 RELATEDWORK
This paper builds on the concepts introduced in previous adversarial
examples work, and our taxonomy of attacks and new attacks
expand around previous attacks on DRL systems.
Adversarial attacks on machine learning models. Our at-
tacks draw some of their techniques from previously proposed
attacks. Goodfellow et al. describe the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) of generating adversarial perturbations in a white-box set-
ting [11]. Carlini and Wagner describe additional methods based on
optimization, which result in smaller perturbations [5]. Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. demonstrate a way to generate a “universal” pertur-
bation that is effective on a set of multiple inputs [23]. Evtimov et al.
show that adversarial examples can be robust to natural lighting
conditions and viewing angles [9]. Considering a more convenient
case for real-world adversaries, black-box attacks without providing
training algorithms are also proposed for general machine learning
models [6, 29]. In our black-box attacks, we apply these techniques
that have been proposed for adapting white-box methods to black-
box scenarios.
Adversarial attacks on DRL models. Recently, Huang et al.
demonstrate an attack that uses FGSM to perturb observation
frames in a DRL setting [12]. However, the white-box setting of this
method requires knowing the exact trained model, the preferred ac-
tion and it is not clear what the malicious goal of adversary is. Their
work also proposes a black-box attack method, where the black-
box setting is based on transferability. In this work, we propose
novel black-box attacks, including the attacks that do not rely on
transferability. In addition, we propose several ways to reduce the
computational complexity of attacks. Lin et al. design an algorithm
to achieve targeted attack for DRLmodels [18]. However, their work
only considers targeted attacks and requires training a generative
model to predict future states, which is already a computational
intensive task. Behzadan and Munir propose a black-box attack
method that trains another DQN network to minimize the expected
return while still using FGSM as the attack method [2]. In terms of
adversarial attack on environment dynamics, Pan et al. propose to
use candidate inference attack to infer possible dynamics used for
training a candidate policy, posing potential privacy-related risk to
deep RL models [27].
Robust RL via adversarial training. Safety and generalization
in various robotics and autonomous driving applications has drawn
2
Table 1: Summary of the adversarial attacks on DRL systems, categorized based on our proposed taxonomy. The name reflects
the category of the attackmethod. For example, obs-nn-wbmeans attack on observation using neural network basedwhite-box
attack. The attack methods we proposed are highlighted using bold text. “Arch.,” “Param.,” and “Query” indicate whether the
attack requires knowledge of the policy network’s architecture, parameters and whether it needs to query the policy network.
Attack MDP Component Attacker Knowledge Real-time Physical Temporal Dependency
White/Black-Box Arch. Param. Query
obs-fgsm-wb Observation White-box Yes Yes Yes Yes No Independent
obs-cw-wb Observation White-box Yes Yes Yes Too slow No Independent
obs-nn-wb Observation White-box Yes Yes Yes Yes No Independent
obs-fgsm-bb Observation Black-box No No No Yes No Independent
obs-imi-bb Observation Black-box No No Yes Yes No Independent
obs-fd-bb Observation Black-box No No Yes Too slow No Independent
obs-sfd-bb Observation Black-box No No Yes Too slow No Independent
obs-seq-fgsm-wb Observation White-box Yes Yes Yes Yes No Sequential
obs-seq-fd-bb Observation Black-box No No Yes Yes No Sequential
obs-seq-sfd-bb Observation Black-box No No Yes Yes No Sequential
act-nn-wb Action White-box Yes Yes Yes Yes No Independent
env-search-bb Dynamics Black-box No No Yes N/A Yes N/A
lots of attention for training robust models [24, 26, 30]. Knowing
how RL models can be attacked is beneficial for training robust RL
agent. Pinto et al. proposes to train a RL agent to provide adversar-
ial attack during training so that the agent can be robust against
dynamics variations [30]. However, since they manually selected
the perturbations on environment dynamics, the attack provided
in their work may not be able to generalize to broader RL systems.
Additionally, their method relies on an accurate modeling of the
environment dynamics, which may not be available for real world
tasks such as robotics and autonomous driving systems.
3 TAXONOMY OF ATTACKS IN DRL
Existing work on attacking DRL systems with adversarial pertur-
bations focuses on perturbing an agent’s observations. This is the
most appealing place to start, with seminal results already suggest-
ing that recognition systems are vulnerable to adversarial examples
[11, 23]. It naturally follows that we should ask whether perturba-
tions introduced in other places in a RL system can cause the agent
to misbehave, and in what scenarios, taking into account (i) can
the attacker perform the attack with limited knowledge about the
agent, (ii) can the attacker perform the attack in real time, and (iii)
can the attacker introduce the perturbation physically. To system-
atically explore this question, we propose a taxonomy of possible
adversarial attacks.
Attack components. In the first layer of our proposed taxon-
omy, we divide attacks based on what components in an MDP
the attacker chooses to perturb: the agent’s observations, actions,
and environment dynamics. We will discuss some of the scenarios
where attacks on these components can be practical. For attacks
applied on the observation space, the pixel values of images can be
changed by installing some virus into the software that is used to
process captured photos from the sensor or in the simulator that
is rendering the environment. In case images are transmitted be-
tween robots and computers, some communications can be altered
by an attacker wirelessly [19]. Some physical observation based
attacks have been analyzed in autonomous driving [9]. For attacks
applied on the action space, the action outputs can be modified
by installing some hardware virus in the actuator executing the
action. This can be realistic in some robotic control tasks where
the control center sends some control signals to the actuator, a
vulnerability in the implementation, for example, vulnerability in
the bluetooth signal transmission, may allow an attacker to modify
those signals [19]. For attacks applied on the environment dynam-
ics, in the autonomous driving case we can change the material
surface characteristic of the road such that the policy trained in one
environment will fail in the perturbed environment; in the robotic
control case, the robot’s mass distribution can be changed such
that the robot may lose balance when executing its original policy
because the robot hasn’t been trained in this case.
Attacker’s knowledge. In the second layer of our proposed
taxonomy, we categorize attacks based on what information the
attacker needs to perform the attack. This divides attacks intowhite-
box attacks and black-box attacks. We make a further categorization
based on the attacker’s knowledge about the policy network’s archi-
tecture, weight parameters and whether the attacker can query the
network. In white-box attacks, the agent has access to the archi-
tecture and weight parameters of the policy network and of course
can query the network. In black-box attacks, the attackers don’t
have access to weight parameters of the policy network and may
or may not have access to the policy network’s architecture. The
attacker may or may not have access to query the policy network.
Further categorization. We consider these additional proper-
ties of attacks.Real-time: while some attacks require more compu-
tation than can be performed in real-time, some are fast enough to
run. Still other attacks perform some precomputation and then are
able to generate perturbations quickly for each step.We identify this
3
pragmatic property as part of our taxonomy. Physical: for RL tasks
that take place in the real world, this property concerns the feasi-
bility of physically applying the perturbation on the environment.
Temporal dependency: we distinguish between attacks that gen-
erate a perturbation in each frame independently from other frames
and online sequential attacks that use information from previous
frames to generate perturbations on later frames.
4 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING POLICIES
In order to study the unexplored parts of our proposed taxonomy
from Section 3, in this section we develop several concrete attacks.
Table 1 summarizes these attacks.
4.1 Attacks on State Observations
We now describe attacks that perturb an agent’s state observations.
In this category of attacks, the attacker changes the input state
observation s to s˜ = s + h(s;w), where the attacker generates per-
turbation h(s ;w) from the original observation s and some learned
parametersw . In order to ensure that perturbations are small, we
require that | |h(s;w)| |∞ ≤ ϵ , which we can enforce by choosing
h to be of the form ϵ tanh(·), and ϵ is a small positive value. We
present both white-box attacks and black-box attacks.
White-box attacks In this setting, we assume that the attacker
can access the agent’s policy network π (a |s) where a refers to the
action and s refers to the state. Huang et al. has previously intro-
duced one attack in this category that applies the FGSM method to
generate white-box perturbation purely on observations. We repro-
duce this experiment with our obs-fgsm-wb attack. This attack’s
application scenario is when we know the policy network’s archi-
tecture and parameters. We also include a variant of Huang et al.’s
attack that replaces FGSM with an optimization based method [5]
in obs-cw-wb. In addition, we propose an attack strategy N-attack
where the perturbation h(s,w) is computed from a deep neural net-
work. in a white-box setting. We call this attack obs-nn-wb. This
attack works when where we know the policy network’s architec-
ture and parameters. We train the parameters w of the attacker
network based on the given policy π to minimize victim policy’s
expected return when the perturbations are applied:
w = argmax
w
Eπ (a |s˜)[
∑
t
γ t r˜t ] = argmaxw Eπ (a |s+h(s,w ))[−
∑
t
γ t rt ].
Here r˜ refers to the opposite of the environment reward. With a
fixed victim policy π , this attack is similar to training a policy. For
example, in DQN, our goal is to perform gradient update onw based
on the following loss function:
L(w) = (Q(s + h(s,w),a) − (r˜ + γ max
a′
Q(s ′ + h(s ′,w),a′)))2,
where Q is the model under attack, s ′ is the next state relative to
current state s . In continuous control using DDPG, our goal is to
perform gradient update onw based on the following loss function
L(w) = (r˜ + γQ(s ′ + h(s ′,w), µ(s ′ + h(s ′,w))) −Q(s + h(s,w),a))2,
where Q is the value function and µ is the actor function.
Black-box attacks. In general, the trained RL models are kept
private to avoid easy attacks. Given such “black-box" models, the
adversary needs to take more sophisticated strategies to perform
the attacks. In the black-box attack, there are different scenarios
based on the knowledge of attacker. First, the attacker is not allowed
to obtain any information about the model architecture, parameters,
or even query information. In this case, the attacker can perform a
“transferability" based attack by attacking a surrogate model and
then transfer the perturbation to the victim model. Huang et al.
introduced a black-box variant of the FGSM attack using trans-
ferability, which we denote as obs-fgsm-bb. This attack requires
access to the original training environment. In this section, we in-
troduce several other novel black-box attack methods and propose
to improve the efficiency of these attacks.
Imitation learning based black-box attack. This attack obs-
imi-bb is inspired by Rusu et al.’s work on policy distillation [33].
The attacker trains a surrogate policy πˆ (a |s,θ ) to imitate the victim
policy π .Then the attacker uses a white-box method on the surro-
gate policy to generate a perturbation and applies that perturbation
on the victim policy.
We provide the details of attack obs-imi-bb, which trains a surro-
gate policy to imitate the victim policy and apply the perturbation
generated from the surrogate policy to the victim policy to perform
the attack. Formally, in a Deep Q learning case, given a black-box
policy πT with access to its policy outputs, we collect some dataset
DT = {(si ,qi )}Ni=0, where each data sample consists of a short
observation sequence si and a vector qi which is the unnormalized
Q-values, and one value corresponds to one action. We will per-
form imitation learning to learn a new policy πS (·|s,θ ) such that
we minimize the following loss function by taking gradient update
with respect to network parameters θ :
L(DT ,θ ) =
|D |∑
i=1
softmax(q
T
i
τ
) ln softmax(
qTi
τ )
softmax(qSi )
,
where T corresponds to the victim policy, S corresponds to our
surrogate policy, and τ is a temperature factor. This attack works
in the setting where we don’t have access to the policy network’s
architecture or parameters, but can query the network.
Finite difference (FD) based black-box attack. Previous black-
box attacks obs-fgsm-bb and obs-imi-bb all require retraining a
surrogate policy. Previous work by Bhagoji et al. [4] applies the
finite difference (FD) method in attacking classification models. We
extend the FD method to DRL systems in obs-fd-bb which doesn’t
require retraining a new policy. This attack works in the setting
where we don’t have the policy network’s architecture or parame-
ters, but can query the network. FD based attack on DRL uses FD
to estimate gradient on the input observations, and then perform
gradient descent to generate perturbations on the input observa-
tions. The key step in FD is to estimate the gradient. Denote the
loss function as L and state input as s ∈ Rn . Then the canonical
basis vector ei is defined as an d dimension vector with 1 only in
the i-th component and 0 otherwise. The finite difference method
estimates gradients via the following equation
FD(L(s),δ ) =
[
L(s + δe1) − L(s − δe1)
2δ ,
· · · , L(s + δed ) − L(s − δed )2δ
]⊺
,
(1)
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where δ is a parameter to control estimation accuracy. For n dimen-
sional input, the finite difference method would require 2n queries
to obtain the estimation, which is computationally intensive for
high dimensional inputs such as images. We propose a sampling
technique to mitigate this computational cost.
Adaptive sampling based FD (SFD). Many deep learning mod-
els extract features from inputs patch-wise and have sparse activa-
tion map [1]. In Figure 2, we compare the gradient pattern of an
image in CIFAR-10 to the random distributed gradient pattern. On
the left image, large gradient are more concentrated in a certain
region rather than distributed in the entire image as in the right
image.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Figure 2: Image gradient distribution. The left image con-
tains the gradient absolute value on an image from CIFAR-
10 with a pretrained ResNet-50. The right image represents
random gradient distribution used for comparison.
We propose a method for estimating gradients that exploits this
spatial structure. In this method, we first estimate the gradient
with respect to some randomly sampled pixels, then iteratively,
we identify pixels where the gradient has a high magnitude and
estimate the gradient with respect to surrounding pixels.
Given a function f (·;w) : Rd → R1, where w is the model
parameter (we omit this for conciseness below), our goal is to es-
timate the gradient of f with respect to an input x ∈ Rd : ∇x fˆ (x).
We define the nontrivial dimension of the gradient of f at x as
{j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,d}; |∇j f (x)| ≥ θ }, i.e., the dimensions with gradi-
ent absolute value greater or equal to a threshold value θ > 0.
To estimate nontrivial dimension of the gradient, first, we ran-
domly sample k dimensions in {1, · · · ,d}, and get a set of di-
mensions S = {S1, S2, · · · , Sk }, and use FD to estimate the gra-
dients for dimensions in S . Then we select a set of dimensions
S ′ = {j ∈ S ; |∇j f (X ;w)| ≥ θ }, and we use FD to estimate the
gradients of the neighbors (a set S ′′) of dimensions in S ′, if these
gradients haven’t been estimated. Then again we select dimensions
with absolute gradients no less than θ from S ′′ and find their neigh-
bors to estimate gradients.We repeat this process forn iterations. By
exploring the sparse gradients this way, we can adaptively sample
dimensions to estimate gradients, and can significantly reduce the
number of queries. We give the full attack algorithm of obs-sfd-bb
(which works in the same scenario as obs-fd-bb) in Algorithm 1.
Here we provide an analysis of our SFD sampling algorithm and
estimate the amount of nontrivial dimension of the gradient that
can be estimated using our method in Lemma 1. The basic idea of
this lemma is to prove that by using our sampling method, we can
sample more of the nontrivial dimension of the gradient than by
Algorithm 1 Adaptive sampling based finite difference (ASFD)
Input:
s ∈ Rd : state vector
f (w): loss function with parametersw
k : # of item to estimate gradient at each step
n: # of iteration
θ : the gradient threshold
δ : finite difference perturbation value
Output: estimated gradient ∇s fˆ (s;w)
Initialization:
∇s fˆ (s;w) ← 0, randomly select k dimensions in {1, 2, · · · ,d}
to form an index set P .
For t = 0 to n
For j ∈ P
If ∇j fˆ (s;w)hasn’t been estimated
Get v ∈ Rd such that vj = 1 and vi = 0,∀i , j
obtain ∇j fˆ (s;w) = f (s+δv;w )−f (s−δv;w )2δ
end
end
P ′ = {k ;k ∈ P , |∇k fˆ (s;w)| ≥ θ }
P = indexes of neighbors of indexes in P ′
end
using random sampling. We also provide an error bound for the
estimated gradient with SFD in Theorem 2.
Definition 4.1 (NeighborDimension’s Gradient). ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,d}
and j = i + 1, we define the neighbor dimension’s gradient as
∇i f (x)N = ∇j f (x). Note that j = i + 1 is equivalent to j = i − 1,
and to be general we choose the first one to obtain the definition.
Definition 4.2 (Non-trivial Gradient Dimension). Given a posi-
tive gradient threshold θ , an input data instance x ∈ Rd , and a
loss function f : Rd → R1, for any dimension i ∈ {1, · · · ,d},
if |∇i f (x)| ≥ θ , then we define this gradient as non-trivial gra-
dient and the corresponding dimension i as non-trivial gradient
dimension. On the other hand, if |∇i f (x)| < θ , then we define this
gradient as trivial gradient and the corresponding dimension i as
trivial gradient dimension.
Definition 4.3 (Gradient Sample Probability). Given a selected
threshold θ > 0 in Algorithm 1, for any x ∈ Rd , define the gradient
sample probability as PA(θ ) = 1|SA |
∑
i ∈SA 1(|∇i f (x)| ≥ θ ), where
SA represents the set of dimensions selected by algorithm A. There-
fore, the gradient sample probability of SFD and random sampling
are PSFD(θ ) and Prandom(θ ) respectively. Some further definitions
on neighbor gradient distribution probability are as following:
• If |∇i f (x)| ≥ β + θ , then define
p(|∇i f (x)N | ∈ [θ , β + θ ]) = q
p(|∇i f (x)N | ∈ [β + θ ,∞)) = 1 − q.
(2)
• If |∇i f (x)| ∈ [θ , β + θ ], then define
p(|∇i f (x)N | ∈ [0,θ ]) = p1
p(|∇i f (x)N | ∈ [θ , β + θ ]) = p2
p(|∇i f (x)N | ∈ [β + θ ,∞)) = p3.
(3)
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Based on the following assumption that these distributionp1,p2,p3
and q are defined over all possible dimensions in one image (over i)
and these distribution works throughout the entire gradient esti-
mation iteration process, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. We make the following assumptions on f : ∃β > 0,
s.t. |∇i f (x) − ∇i f (x)N | ≤ β,∀i ∈ {1, · · · ,d − 1},∀x ∈ Rd . For
dimension i whose gradient |∇i f (x)| ∈ [θ , β + θ ], the probability
that the gradient magnitude of its neighborhood pixel is in [0,θ ] is
p1. We conclude, as long as p1 < 1 − Prandom(θ ), we have PSFD(θ ) >
Prandom(θ ).
The intuitive understanding of this lemma is that when the
chance of getting gradient absolute value smaller than θ is less
likely around pixels with gradient absolute value greater or equal
to θ than if randomly sampling from the image, our method will be
more sample efficient than random sample method.
Proof. Following the notation in Lemma 1, define
Prandom(β + θ ) =
1
|SA |
∑
i ∈SA
1(|∇i f (x)| ≥ β + θ )
Prandom(θ ) =
1
|SA |
∑
i ∈SA
1(|∇i f (x)| ≥ θ )
(4)
Note the randomness is with respect to the dimensions. These
probabilities are, when we randomly choose k dimensions in a
gradient vector of d dimensions, the chance of sampling some
dimension with gradient absolute value no less than β + θ or θ ,
respectively. For ∇i f (x), its neighbor gradient’s absolute value
follows the following distribution:
DefineA0 = Prandom(θ+β)k,B0 = [Prandom(θ )−Prandom(θ+β)]k
as the number of nontrivial gradients estimated in iteration 0, and
define
At = (1 − q) ∗At−1 + p3 ∗ Bt−1
Bt = q ∗At−1 + p2 ∗ Bt−1, (5)
as the number of nontrivial gradients estimated in iteration t , then
the ratio
Rt =
At + Bt
At−1 + Bt−1
characterizes in every iteration, the ratio of nontrivial gradient
estimation over the total number of gradient estimation for t ≥ 1,
while Prandom(θ ) characterizes nontrivial gradient estimation ratio
if using random sampling method. For t = 0, R0 = Prandom(θ ). Since
Rt is the ratio of the number non-trivial gradients over the total
number of gradients estimated in the t-th iteration, if we randomly
select the dimensions, Rt will be the same as Prandom(θ ). Using our
SFD method, if for every t > 0, we have Rt ≥ Prandom(θ ), then
overall speaking, the ratio of the number of non-trivial gradients
estimated over the total number of gradients estimated, PSFD(θ ),
will be greater than Prandom(θ ). The definition of PSFD(θ ) is
PSFD(θ ) =
∑n
i=1At + Bt∑n−1
i=0 At + Bt
, (6)
where n is the number of iterations.
We now prove that if p1 ≤ 1 − Prandom(θ ), then for t > 0,
Rt =
At + Bt
At−1 + Bt−1
≥ Prandom(θ ). (7)
More specifically, for t = 0, since we perform uniform random
sampling, and we sample k dimensions, we have
R0 =
Prandom(θ )k
k
= Prandom(θ ). (8)
Then if we can prove that for t ≥ 1, Rt ≥ Prandom(θ ), and for some
t , we have Rt > Prandom(θ ), it in turn proves PSFD(θ ) > Prandom(θ ).
The reason is that if for every step in our SFD algorithm the sample
efficiency is at least the same as random sampling, and for some
iterations our SFD is more efficient, then overall speaking our SFD
based gradient estimation is more efficient than random sampling
based gradient estimation.
Now from the above definition, we have
Rt =
At + Bt
At−1 + Bt−1
=
At−1(1 − q) + p3Bt−1 + qAt−1 + p2Bt−1
At−1 + Bt−1
=
At−1 + (1 − p1)Bt−1
At−1 + Bt−1
= 1 − p1Bt−1
At−1 + Bt−1
> 1 − p1
(9)
Therefore, whenp1 < 1−Prandom(θ ),Rt > Prandom(θ ), our sampling
algorithm is more efficient than random sampling.
□
This lemma suggests that when the gradient distribution is more
concentrated (p1 is small, then p1 < 1 − Prandom(θ )), then our sam-
pling algorithm is more efficient than random sampling. Next we
give another theorem about the upper bound for the gradient esti-
mation error and the proof for this theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose we sample all nontrivial dimensions of the
gradient and estimate the gradient with perturbation strength δ , the
estimation error of the gradients is upper bounded by the following
inequality,
∥∇ fˆ (x) − ∇f (x)∥1 ≤ SθCδ2 + (d − Sθ )θ , (10)
for constant C > 0, Sθ =
∑d
i=1 1(|∇i f (x)| ≥ θ ), and ∇ fˆ (x) is the
estimated gradient of f with respect to x .
Proof. Now we prove the Theorem 2: when x ∈ R1, assume
function f is C∞, by Taylor’s series we have
f (x + δ ) = f (x) + f ′(x)δ + δ
2
2 f
′′(x) + h
3
3! f
(3)(x) + · · ·
f (x − δ ) = f (x) − f ′(x)δ + δ
2
2 f
′′(x) − δ
3
3! f
(3)(x) + · · · .
(11)
Combine the two equations we get
f (x + δ ) − f (x − δ )
2δ − f
′(x) =
∞∑
i=1
δ2i
(2i + 1)! f
(2i+1)(x), (12)
which means the truncation error is bounded by O(δ2). Moreover,
we have  f (x + δ ) − f (x − δ )
2h − f
′(x) ≤ Cδ2, (13)
where C = supt ∈[x−δ0,x+δ0]
f (3)(t )
6 , and 0 < δ ≤ δ0.
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We can regard each dimension as a single variable function f (xi ),
then we have f (xi + δ ) − f (xi − δ )
2δ − f
′(xi )
 ≤ Cδ2. (14)
Then ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,d}, assume we are able to sample all nontrivial
gradients with absolute gradient value no less than θ , then we have∑
i ∈{1,2, · · · ,d },∇i f (x )≥θ
∥∇i fˆ (x) − ∇i f (x)∥1 ≤ SθCδ2∑
i ∈{1,2, · · · ,d },∇i f (x )<θ
∥∇i fˆ (x) − ∇i f (x)∥1 ≤ (d − Sθ )θ .
(15)
Therefore, the truncation error of gradients estimation is upper
bounded by the following inequality.
∥∇ fˆ (x) − ∇f (x)∥1 ≤ SθCδ2 + (d − Sθ )θ , (16)
for some C > 0, and ∇ fˆ (x) is the estimated gradient of f with
respect to x .
□
Online sequential attacks. In a DRL setting, consecutive ob-
servations are not i.i.d.—instead, they are highly correlated, with
each state depending on previous ones. It’s then possible to perform
an attack with less computation than performing the attack inde-
pendently on each state. Considering real-world cases, for example,
an autonomous robot would take a real-time video as input to help
make decisions, an attacker is motivated to generate perturbations
only based on previous states and apply it to future states, which
we refer to as an online sequential attack. We hypothesize that a
perturbation generated this way is effective on subsequent states.
Universal attack based approach. We propose online sequen-
tial attacks obs-seq-fgsm-wb, obs-seq-fd-bb, and obs-seq-sfd-bb
that exploit this structure of the observations. obs-seq-fgsm-wb
works in standard white-box setting, where we know the archi-
tecture and parameters of the policy network; obs-seq-fd-bb and
obs-seq-sfd-bb works in the same setting as obs-fd-bb. In these
attacks, we first collect a number k of observation frames and gen-
erate a single perturbation using the averaged gradient on these
frames (or estimated gradients using FD or SFD, in the case of obs-
seq-fd-bb and obs-seq-sfd-bb). Then, we apply that perturbation to
all subsequent frames. In obs-seq-sfd-bb, we combine the universal
attack approach and the adaptive sampling technique for finite
difference estimates. We improve upon the above attack by finding
the the set of frames that appear to be most important and using
the gradients from those frames. With this, we hope to maintain
attack effectiveness while reducing the number of queries needed.
We propose to select a subset of frames within the first k based on
the variance of their Q values. Then, in all subsequent frames, the
attack applies a perturbation generated from the averaged gradient.
We select an optimal set of important frames with high value vari-
ance to generate the perturbations. We give a proof in Corollary 3
below for why attacking these important frames is more effective
in terms of reducing the overall expected return.
Corollary 3. Let the state and state-action value be V (s) and
Q(s,a) respectively for a policy π with time horizon H . We con-
clude that ∀t1, t2 ∈ 1, 2, · · · ,H , if Var(Q(st1 , ·)) ≥ Var(Q(st2 , ·)),
then Eπ
[∑H
t=0 γ
t rt |do(st1 = sˆt1 )
] ≤ Eπ [∑Ht=0 γ t rt |do(st2 = sˆt2 )] ,
where do(st1 = sˆt1 ) means the observation at time t1 is changed from
st1 to sˆt1 .
Proof. Recall the definition of Q value is
Q(sτ ,aτ ) = Eπ [
H−1∑
t=τ
γ t−τ rt |sτ ,aτ ]. (17)
The variance of Q value at a state s is defined as
Var (Q(s)) = 1|A| − 1
|A |∑
i=1
(
Q(s,ai ) − 1|A|
|A |∑
j=1
Q(s,aj )
)2
, (18)
where A is the action space of the MDP, and |A| denotes the
number of actions. Suppose we are to attack state sm and state sn
where the Q value variance of this two states areVar (Q(sm ), ·) and
Var (Q(sn ), ·), and assumem < n.
Denote the state-action pair Q values after attack are Q(sm , aˆm )
and Q(sn , aˆn ), respectively. During the attack, state sm is modified
to sˆm , and state sn is modified to sˆn , and their action’s Q-value also
change, so we use aˆm and aˆn to denote the actions after the attack.
By using sm and sn instead of sˆm and sˆn , we mean that though the
observed states are modified by the attack algorithm, but the true
states do not change. By using a different action notation, we mean
that since the observed states have been modified, the optimal
actions at the modified states can be different from the optimal
actions at the original observed states. Then the total discounted
expected return for the entire episode can be expressed as (assume
all actions are optimal actions)
Q ′ = Q(s0,a0) − γmQ(sm ,am ) + γmQ(sm , aˆm ),
Q ′′ = Q(s0,a0) − γnQ(sn ,an ) + γnQ(sn , aˆn ).
(19)
Sincem < n, Q ′′ can also be expressed as
Q ′′ = Q(s0,a0) − γmQ(sm ,am ) + γmQ(sm ,am )
− γnQ(sn ,an ) + γnQ(sn , aˆn ). (20)
Subtract Q ′ by Q ′′ we get
Q ′ −Q ′′ = γm (Q(sm , aˆm ) −Q(sm ,am ))
+ γnQ(sn ,an ) − γnQ(sn , aˆn )
= − γm [Q(sm ,am ) −Q(sm , aˆm )
− γn−m (Q(sn ,an ) −Q(sn , aˆn ))].
(21)
According to our claim that states where the variance of Q value
function is small will get better attack effect, supposeVar (Q(sm )) >
Var (Q(sn )), and assume the range of Q value at step m is larger
than step n, then we have
Q(sm ,am ) −Q(sm , aˆm ) > Q(sn ,an ) −Q(sn , aˆn )
> γn−m [Q(sn ,an ) −Q(sn , aˆn )]. (22)
Therefore Q ′ −Q ′′ < 0 which means attack statem the agent will
get less return in expectation. IfVar (Q(sm )) < Var (Q(sn )), assume
the range of Q value at stepm is smaller than step n, then we have
Q(sm ,am ) −Q(sm , aˆm ) < Q(sn ,an ) −Q(sn , aˆn ). (23)
If n −m is very small or Q(sn ,an ) −Q(sn , aˆn ) is large enough such
that Q(sm ,am ) − Q(sm , aˆm ) < γn−m [Q(sn ,an ) − Q(sn , aˆn )], then
we haveQ ′ −Q ′′ > 0 which means attacking statem the agent will
get more reward in expectation than attacking state n. □
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4.2 Attacks on Action Selection
Our second category of attacks is to directly attack action output
and minimize the expected return. We experiment with one attack
in this category, under a white-box scenario, act-nn-wb. Here we
train another policy network that takes in the state s and outputs
a perturbation on the Q function: Q ′(s,a,w), the goal is also to
minimize the expected return. For example, in DQN, the loss is
chosen to be L(w) = (Q(s,a) +Q ′(s,a,w) − r˜ − γ maxa′(Q(s ′,a′) +
Q ′(s ′,a′,w)))2. For DDPG, the loss is chosen to be L(w) = (Q(s,a =
µ(s)) + Q ′(s,a = µ(s),w) − r˜ − γ (Q(s ′,a′ = µ(s ′)) + Q ′(s ′,a′ =
µ(s ′),w)))2, where r˜ = −r is reward that captures the attacker’s
goal of minimizing the victim agent’s expected return. This second
approach to learn the attack h is to treat the environment and the
original policy π together as a new environment, and view attacks
as actions.
4.3 Attacks on Environment Dynamics
In this third category, attacks perturb the environment transition
model. In our case, we aim to achieve targeted attack, which means
we want to change the dynamics such that the agent will fail in a
specific way. Define the environment dynamics asM, the agent’s
policy as π , the agent’s state at step t following the current policy
under current dynamics as st , and define a mapping from π ,M
to st :st ∼ f (st |π ,M, s0), which outputs the state at time step t :
st given initial state s0, policy π , and environment dynamicsM.
The task of attacking environment dynamics is to find another
dynamicsM ′ such that the agent will reach a target state s ′t at step
t :M ′ = argminM ∥s ′t − Est∼f (st |π ,M,s0)[st ]∥.
Random dynamics search. A naive way to find the target
dynamics, which we demonstrate in env-rand-bb, is to use random
search. Specifically, we randomly propose a new dynamics and
see whether, under this dynamics, the agent will reach s ′t . This
method works in the setting where we don’t need to have access to
the policy network’s architecture and parameters, but just need to
query the network.
Adversarial dynamics search. We design a more systematic
algorithm based on RL to search for a dynamics to attack and call
this method env-search-bb. At each time step, an attacker proposes
a change to the current environment dynamics with some perturba-
tion ∆M, where ∥∆M/M∥ is bounded by some constant ϵ , and we
find the new state st,M′ at time step t following the current policy
under dynamicsM ′ =M + ∆M, then the attacker agent will get
reward r˜ = 1/∥st,M′ − s ′t ∥. We demonstrate this in env-search-bb
using DDPG [17] to train the attacker. In order to show that this
method works better than random search, we also compare with the
random dynamics search method, and keep the bound of maximum
perturbation ∥∆M/M∥ the same. This attack works in the same
setting as env-rand-bb.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We attack several agents trained for five different RL environments:
Atari games Pong and Enduro [3], HalfCheetah and Hopper in
MuJoCo [34], and the driving simulation TORCS [28]. We train
DQN [22] on Pong, Enduro and TORCS, and we train DDPG [17]
on HalfCheetah and Hopper. The reward function for TORCS comes
from [28]. The DQN network architecture comes from [22]. The
network for continuous control using DDPG comes from [8]. For
each game, we train the above agents with different random seeds
and different architectures in order to evaluate different conditions
in the transferability and imitation learning based black-box attack.
Details of network structure and the performance for each game
are included in Appendix A.
5.1 Experimental Design
We compare the agents’ performance under all attacks with their
performance under no attack, denoted as non-adv.
Attacks on observation. We test these attacks under L∞ per-
turbation bounds of ϵ = 0.005 and ϵ = 0.01 on the Atari games and
MuJoCo simulations and ϵ = 0.05 and ϵ = 0.1 on TORCS.1
• First, we test the white-box attacks obs-fgsm-wb and obs-
nn-wb on all five environments.
• Second, we test the attack obs-fgsm-bb under two different
conditions: (1) In obs-fgsm-bb(1), the attacker uses the same
network structure in the surrogate model as the victim pol-
icy and (2) In obs-fgsm-bb(2), the attacker uses a different
network structure for the surrogate model.
• We test the attack obs-imi-bb on all five environments. Sim-
ilar to the transferability attacks, we test this attack under
same-architecture (obs-imi-bb(1)) and different-architecture
(obs-imi-bb(2)) conditions. We use FGSM to generate pertur-
bations on the surrogate policy.
• We test obs-sfd-bb under different numbers of SFD iterations;
we denote an attack that uses i iterations as obs-s[i]fd-bb.
The number of queries is significantly reduced in obs-sfd-bb
than obs-fd-bb; we show the actual numbers of queries used
in Table 2.
• For the attack obs-seq-fgsm-wb, we test under the condi-
tion obs-seq[Fk]-fgsm-wb (F for “first”), where we use all of
the first k frames to compute the gradient for generating a
perturbation for the subsequent frames.
• For the attacks obs-seq-fd-bb and obs-seq-sfd-bb, we test
under three conditions. (i) In obs-seq[Fk]-fd-bb, we look at
the first k frames and use FD to estimate the gradient; (ii) In
obs-seq[Lk]-fd-bb and obs-seq[Lk]-s[i]fd-bb (L for “largest”),
we again look at the first k frames, but we select only the
20% of the frames that have the largest Q value variance to
generate the universal perturbation; (iii) obs-seq[Sk]-fd-bb
(S for “smallest”) is similar to the previous one, we select 20%
of the first k frames that have the smallest Q value variance
to generate the universal perturbation.
• We additionally test a random perturbation based online
sequential attack obs-seq-rand-bb, where we take a sample
from uniform random noise to generate a perturbation and
apply on all frames. Although this attack does not consider
the starting frames, we still test it under different conditions
obs-seq[Fk]-rand-bb, where we start adding the random
perturbation after the k-th frame. This makes it consistent
with the other online sequential attacks that apply their
perturbation after the kth frame.
1Values are in range [0,1]
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(a) Episodic Reward (b) Cumulative Reward (ϵ=0.05) (c) Cumulative Reward (ϵ=0.10)
Figure 3: Episodic reward under different attack methods and cumulative reward of different black-box attacks on TORCS.
Attacks on action selection. We test the action selection attack
act-nn-wb on the Atari games, TORCS, and MuJoCo robotic control
tasks.
Attacks environment dynamics. We test the environment
dynamics attacks env-rand-bb and env-search-bb on the MuJoCo
environments and TORCS. In the tests on MuJoCo, we perturb the
body mass and body inertia vector, which are in R32 and R20 in
HalfCheetah and Hopper environments, respectively. In the tests
on TORCS, we perturb the road friction coefficient and bump size,
which is in R10. The perturbation strength is within 10% of the
original magnitude of the dynamics being perturbed.
Figure 4: Episodic rewards among different attack methods
onAtari games. Dotted lines are black-box attackwhile dash
lines are white-box attack.
Table 2: Number of queries for SFD on each image among
different settings. (14112 would be needed for FD.)
Bound 10 iter. 20 iter. 40 iter. 100 iter.
0.05 1233 ± 50 2042 ± 77 3513 ± 107 5926 ± 715
0.10 1234 ± 41 2028 ± 87 3555 ± 87 6093 ± 399
5.2 Experimental Results
Attacks on observation. Figure 3a shows the results of the attacks
on observations on TORCS, including all methods on attacking
observations and the results of non-adv. In addition, we show in
Figure 14 the decomposition of TORCS reward into progress related
reward and catastrophe related reward (reward for collisions). We
show that our attack achieves a significant number of crashes on the
autonomous driving environment compared with obs-fgsm-wb. On
TORCS, our neural network based attack obs-nn-wb achieves better
attack performance than the FGSM attack obs-fgsm-wb. Under a
black-box setting, our proposed imitation learning based attacks
obs-imi-bb(1), obs-imi-bb(2), and the FD based attack obs-fd-bb
achieves better attack performance than the transferability based
attacks obs-fgsm-bb(1) and obs-fgsm-bb(2).
Figures 3b and 3c compare the cumulative rewards among dif-
ferent black-box methods on TORCS. These figures show that the
policy is vulnerable to all of the black-box methods. Specifically,
they show that obs-s[i]fd-bb can achieve similar performance to
FD under each value of the perturbation bound ϵ . In Table 2, we
provide the number of queries for using obs-sfd-bb and obs-fd-bb,
and the results show that obs-sfd-bb uses significantly less queries
(around 1000 to 6000) than obs-fd-bb (around 14,000) but achieves
similar attack performance. The SFD method only samples part of
the pixels to calculate gradient while the vanilla FDmethod requires
gradient computation at all pixels. Therefore, obs-sfd-bb is more
efficient in terms of running time than obs-fd-bb, which indicates
the effectiveness of our adaptive sampling algorithm in reducing
gradient computation time and keeping the attack performance.
The results for comparing obs-seq[Fk]-fgsm-wb, obs-seq[Fk]-
fd-bb, and obs-seq[Fk]-rand-bb are shown in Figure 5 (left) for
perturbation of different L∞ norm bound (ϵ = 0.05 and 0.1). The
two figures show the cumulative reward for one episode when the
states are under attack. Comparing the results, our proposed obs-
seq[Fk]-fd-bb achieves close attack performance compared with
our obs-seq[Fk]-fgsm-wb, and the baseline obs-seq[Fk]-rand-bb
is not effective. Figure 5 (right) shows that when we select a set
of states with the largest Q value variance (obs-seq[Lk]-fd-bb) to
estimate the gradient, the attack is more effective than selecting
states with the smallest Q value variance (obs-seq[Sk]-fd-bb), which
indicates that selecting frames with large Q value variance is more
effective. We see that when k is very small (k = 10), the estimated
universal perturbation may be not accurate, and when k = 60, the
attack performance is reasonably good.
In Figure 6, we show the results of obs-seq[Lk]-s[i]fd-bb by
varying the number of iterations i , and select the 20% of frames with
the largest Q value variance within the first k frames to estimate the
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Figure 5: Performance of universal attack based approach considering all starting images (seq[Fk]-, left two graphs) and subsets
of frames with largest (seq[Lk]-) and smallest (seq[Sk]-) Q value variance (right two images). Results shown for TORCS, under
two perturbation bounds ϵ .
Figure 6: Performance of universal attack based approach
with different numbers of query iterations with obs-seq-sfd-
bb
gradient using SFD. It is clear that with more iterations, we are able
to get more accurate estimation of the gradients and thus achieve
better attack performance, while the total number of queries is still
significantly reduced. We conclude from Table 2 that when i = 100,
the number of queries for SFD is around 6k, which is significantly
smaller than needed for FD, which takes 14k queries to estimate
the gradient on an image of size 84 × 84 (14112 = 84 × 84 × 2).
We provide the results of attack applied on observation space
in other environments in Figure 4, Figure 8, Figure 7, and Figure 9.
These environments include Atari game Pong and Enduro, and Mu-
JoCo robotics simulation environments HalfCheetah and Hopper. It
can be observed from these results that, for obs-seq[Lk]-fd-bb, there
exists at least one k > 0 such that when we estimate a universal
perturbation from the top 20% frames of the first k frames and apply
the perturbation on all subsequent frames starting from the k-th
frame, we are able to achieve reasonably good attack performance.
In some environments, such as in Pong, k = 10 is already enough
to induce strong attack; while in Enduro, k = 160 achieves better
performance than k = 10 or k = 60. The Enduro environment
is also an autonomous driving environment that is simpler than
the TORCS environment, and we observed consistent results in
the two environments. Note that different thresholds ϵ are applied
according to the complexity of the two environments.
Attacks on action selection. We present the results of our
attacks on action selection in Figure 10. The results show that
action space attack is also effective. With the larger perturbation
bound, we achieve better attack performance.
Attacks on environment dynamics. In Table 3, we show our
results for performing targeted adversarial environment dynamics
attack. The results are the L2 distance to the target state (the smaller
the better). Our goal is to attack the environment dynamics so the
victim agent will fail in a pre-specified way. For example, for a
Hopper to turn over and for a self driving car to drive off road and
hit obstacles. The results show that random searchmethod performs
worse than RL based search method in terms of reaching a specific
state after certain steps. The quality of the attack can be qualitatively
evaluated by observing the sequence of states when the agent is
being attacked and see whether the target state has been achieved.
In Figures 11–13, we show the sequences of states when the agents
are under attack with the random search or reinforcement learning
based search method. The last image in each sequence denotes the
state at same step t . The last image in each abnormal dynamics
rollout sequence corresponds to the target state, the last image in
the attacked dynamics using RL search denotes the attacked results
using env-search-bb, and the last image in the attacked dynamics
using random search denotes the attacked results using env-rand-
bb. It can be seen from these figures that env-search-bb method
is very effective at achieving targeted attack while using random
search, it is relatively harder to achieve this.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Though this paper is about adversarial attacks on deep reinforce-
ment learning, one important direction is to develop reinforcement
learning methods that are robust and how to defense again attacks.
We provide some discussion regarding these perspectives.
General Attacks on DRL. We have attempted to study a broad
scope of possible attacks: perturbing different parts of a reinforce-
ment learning system, under threat models with different attacker
knowledge, and using new techniques to reduce attack computation
cost. However, our experiments are not an exhaustive set of possi-
ble attacks. A general attacker may gain access to perturb multiple
parts of an RL system and may utilize still newer techniques to
compute effective perturbations efficiently.
Improving Robustness of RL. There have been increasing
interest in training RL algorithms that can be robust against pertur-
bations in the environment, or even adversarial attacks. Previous
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(a) ϵ=0.005 | HalfCheetah (b) ϵ=0.01 | HalfCheetah (c) ϵ=0.005 | Hopper (d) ϵ=0.01 | Hopper
Figure 7: Performance among different attack methods on MuJoCo. We use the format “L∞ bound | Environment” to label the
settings of each image.
(a) ϵ= 0.005|Pong (b) ϵ= 0.01|Pong (c) ϵ=0.005|Enduro (d) ϵ=0.01|Enduro
Figure 8: (a-b): Cumulative reward after adding optimal state based universal perturbation on Pong game. (c-d): Cumulative
reward after adding optimal state based universal perturbation on Enduro game. The results for Enduro are different from
the TORCS results since the threshold ϵ is different from the TORCS case.
(a) ϵ=0.005 | HalfCheetah (b) ϵ=0.01 | HalfCheetah (c) ϵ=0.005 | Hopper (d) ϵ=0.01 | Hopper
Figure 9: Cumulative reward after adding optimal state based universal perturbation onMujoco.We use the format “L∞ bound
| Environment” to label the settings of each image.
(a) Atari and Torcs (b) Mujoco
Figure 10: Action based attacks. Results of act-nn-wb on Atari
games, TORCS, and MuJoCo tasks.
Table 3: Results of environment dynamics based attacks.
Environment env-rand-bb env-search-bb
HalfCheetah 7.91 5.76
Hopper 1.89 0.0017
TORCS 25.02 22.75
methods that aim to improve the robustness of RL either try to
apply random perturbation to the observation or apply gradient
based noise to the observation to induce the agent to choose some
sub-optimal actions. On the one hand, our finite difference and sam-
pling based finite difference based method can provide faster attack
than traditional FGSM based attack that requires back-propagation
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(a) Agent’s behavior under normal dynamics
(b) Agent’s behavior under abnormal dynamics
(c) Agent’s behavior under attacked dynamics using RL
(d) Agent’s behavior under attacked dynamics using random search
Figure 11: Results for Dynamics Attack on HalfCheetah
(a) Agent’s behavior under normal dynamics
(b) Agent’s behavior under abnormal dynamics
(c) Agent’s behavior under attacked dynamics using RL
(d) Agent’s behavior under attacked dynamics using random search
Figure 12: Results for Dynamics Attack on Hopper
to calculate gradient, therefore can be incorporated into the training
of RL policies to improve the robustness of RL policy. The environ-
ment dynamics attack can help to find the environment where the
current agent is vulnerable. On the other hand, our methods provide
tools to evaluate the vulnerability of the trained RL policy. Finally,
we hope that our proposed taxonomy helps guide future research in
making DRL systems robust, and we offer our experimental results
as baselines for future robust RL techniques to compare against.
Priority of Defense Towards the Proposed Attacks. From
the perspective of training robust RL policies, it is important to
know the severeness of the risk related with the proposed attacks.
Among the proposed attacks, the environment dynamics attack can
be a more realistic potential risk to consider than the other two
attacks based on observations or action space. The reason is that
this attack does not require access to modify the policy network
software system and only requires access to modify environment
(a) Agent’s behavior under normal dynamics
(b) Agent’s behavior under abnormal dynamics
(c) Agent’s behavior under attacked dynamics using RL
(d) Agent’s behavior under attacked dynamics using random search
Figure 13: Results for Dynamics Attack on TORCS
Figure 14: Reward Decomposition on the TORCS environ-
ment under obs-nn-wb attack and obs-fgsm-wb. Progress
reward is related with driving forward while catastrophe re-
ward is related with colliding into obstacles.
dynamics, and by modifying the environment dynamics parameters
such as changing road condition in autonomous driving, we see
from our experiments that the agent tends to fail with the original
policy. The observation and action space attack, especially the black-
box attacks, are also important to defend against, since an attacker
can definitely query the network and may have access to change
the observations or action selection.
Potential Defenses. Previous work, with an increasing interest
in training robust RL algorithms, has tried (i) applying random
perturbation to the observation or (ii) applying gradient based noise
to the observation in order to exercise the agent under training
on possible perturbations. As a first order enhancement, our finite
difference and sampling based finite difference based attacks can
fit in the same pipeline and can even run faster than traditional
FGSM. However, valuable future defenses should also consider
which attacks would bemore practical to carry out. An environment
dynamics attack, for example, can perturb the dynamicswithout any
electronic modification to the system’s sensors or controllers. Black-
box attacks with query access may also be increasingly realistic
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with the availability of consumer products that use RL making
oracles widely available.
We hope our exploratory work and the taxonomy of attacks we
describe help form a more complete view for what threats should be
considered in ongoing research in robust reinforcement learning.
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A EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We trained DQN models on Pong, Enduro, and TORCS, and trained
DDPG models on HalfCheetah and Hopper. The DQN model for
training Pong and Enduro consists of 3 convolutional layers and
2 fully connected layers. The two network architectures differ in
their number of filters. Specifically, the first network structure is
C(4, 32, 8, 4)−C(32, 64, 4, 2)−C(64, 64, 3, 1)−F (3136, 512)−F (512,na),
where C(c1, c2,k, s) denotes a convolutional layer of input channel
number c1, output channel number c2, kernel size k , and stride s .
F (h1,h2) denotes a fully connected layer with input dimension h1
and output dimension h2, and na is the number of actions in the
environment. The DQNmodel for training TORCS consists of 3 con-
vultional layers and 2 or 3 fully connected layers. The convultional
layers’ structure isC(12, 32, 8, 4)−C(32, 64, 4, 2)−C(64, 64, 3, 1), and
the fully connected layer structure is F (3136, 512) − F (512, 9) for
one model and F (3136, 512) − F (512, 128) − F (128, 9) for the other
model.
The DDPG model for training HalfCheetah and Hopper consists
of several fully connected layers. We trained two different policy
network structures on all MuJoCo environments. The first model’s
actor is a network of size F (dimin , 64) − F (64, 64) − F (64,na) and
the critic is a network of size F (dimin , 64)−F (64, 64)−F (64, 1). The
second model’s actor is a network of size F (dimin , 64) − F (64, 64) −
F (64, 64) − F (64, 64) − F (64,na), and the critic is a network of size
F (dimin , 64) − F (64, 64) − F (64, 64) − F (64, 64) − F (64, 1). For both
models, we added ReLU activation layers between these fully con-
nected layers.
The TORCS autonomous driving environment is a discrete action
space control environment with 9 actions, they are turn left, turn
right, keep going, turn left and accelerate, turn right and accelerate,
accelerate, turn left and decelerate, turn right and decelerate and
decelerate. The other 4 games, Pong, Enduro, HalfCheetah, and
Hopper are standard OpenAI gym environment.
The trainedmodel’s performancewhen testedwithout any attack
is included in the following Table 4.
Table 4: Model performance among different environments
Torcs Enduro Pong HalfCheetah Hopper
Episodic reward 1720.8 1308 21 8257 3061
Episode length 1351 16634 1654 1000 1000
The DDPG neural network used for env-search-bb is the same as
the first model (3-layer fully connected network) used for training
the policy for HalfCheetah, except that the input dimension dimin
is of the perturbation parameters’ dimension, and output dimension
is also of the perturbation parameters’ dimension. For HalfCheetah,
Hopper and TORCS, these input and output dimensions are 32, 20,
and 10, respectively.
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